

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

A Quota of Patriotism:

The Decline of Volunteerism in Northampton,
Massachusetts, during the Civil War

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[Prof. LAURIE]

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by

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Social historians have only recently turned their attentions to the Civil War, having long left the field to political and military historians. Social histories of the Civil War concentrate on the Union home front, the Northern cities and towns, chiefly in their capacity as gatherers and organizers of fighting men. These works take many of their cues from earlier studies of volunteerism, conscription, and draft evasion that have unearthed ample material for accounts of widespread corruption and cynicism in the North. From general surveys of the whole North, based upon the Adjutant General's records in Washington, social historians have moved to individual community studies. Their work reveals an apparent pattern of gradually exhausted volunteerism in Northern cities and towns, as communities relied increasingly upon outsiders to satisfy federally-imposed quotas of troops.¹

These recent community studies have been concerned to a great extent with demographic analyses of enlisted volunteers in an effort to weigh the significance of age, occupation, marital status, and other variables. The present study of Northampton, the shire town of Hampshire County, Massachusetts, takes the narrative of exhausted volunteerism as a model, but concentrates more closely on measures taken by the town either to encourage volunteerism or, later, to subsidize evasion. As volunteerism declined, town government was obliged to take a

greater part in encouraging enlistments or otherwise satisfying the obligations imposed upon it by federal and state government. At the same time, every town had to remain responsive to the needs of the local economy and the needs of families deprived of support by the war. Tensions between local needs and national duties only intensified a sense of crisis caused by the increasingly apparent unreliability of the old, spontaneous volunteer spirit on both the individual and the community level. In all quarters of community life the Civil War posed the question of what would serve as a proper, patriotic contribution to the national cause. As the war progressed, all communities found themselves less empowered to answer these questions on their own.

Northampton was founded in 1654 and remained a largely rural, largely Congregationalist community for the next two centuries. In the nineteenth century the shire town took the lead in developing a rural capitalist economy, as farmers turned to cash crops like tobacco and factory districts developed near the Mill River in suburbs like Florence and Leeds. Older patterns of family-based economy persisted, but declined relative to the greater employment of operatives, laborers, and clerks from outside the home. Barter and long term credit fell into disfavor as cash became the preferred medium of exchange and the merchants of "Shop Row" more strictly scrutinized even short term credit transactions. Between 1848 and 1865 the town could boast of a generation of growth, and little in

Northampton seemed different, except in scale, from developments elsewhere in the North.²

By 1861 the Republican party regularly carried the town by comfortable majorities. Northampton's Republicans were a contentious collection of Whigs, Free-Soilers, and nativists, chronically susceptible to intraparty factionalism. "The Republicans are notoriously an independent, thinking class of men," wrote Henry S. Gere, editor of the Hampshire Gazette and Republican Treasurer of Hampshire County, "They as individuals are restrained with difficulty, and hence it is hard for them to work together harmoniously." Despite this perceived handicap, the party closed ranks in Presidential elections, showing their strength and enthusiasm in public parades of Wide Awakes and Lincoln Clubs. Gere and his political ally Luke Lyman, a tobacco farmer and insurance agent, conscientiously appealed to younger voters, crediting "the young men" of Northampton for their elevation to county offices. The rival paper, the Free Press, equally supported the national party, but tended to take the side of bolters from the regular local ranks.³

Among the political elite the proprietors of "Shop Row" constituted an elite, if not a law, unto themselves. As the town lacked a professional police force, local businessmen contributed to a private "Society for the Detection of Thieves and Robbers," which employed its own "pursuers." The leadership of the society in 1860 crossed party lines, and Ansel Wright, a deputy sheriff, served as a pursuer for nearly twenty years. Temperance was the cause of the town's professional

elite of doctors, lawyers, and judges, many of whom found themselves victims of a series of arson fires in the 1850s. Combined in the dominant political party, these elites had a common interest in order and security.⁴

Since Northampton had neither ward voting nor representation in town government by wards, the strength of the Democratic party and its likely constituents can be measured only by the town election returns. Although as early as 1855 immigrants made up twenty-four per cent of Northampton's population, and Irish immigrants alone made up seventeen per cent, the press offers little evidence of ethnic political activity. Many of these immigrants were women seeking work in factories or as domestics, and many of the men remained unnaturalized and thus disqualified from political participation. Conscious of their exclusion, the Irish appeared to have kept to themselves, appearing in the press most often as drunken defendants in the court reports. Native Democrats split between the pro-slavery John Breckinridge and Stephen Douglas, the apostle of "popular sovereignty," reflecting the fatal division of the national party in 1860. Efforts to coalesce with the moderate Constitutional Union party proved fruitless, as the vote for Lincoln dwarfed the combined tally of all opposing parties.⁵

Republicans saw the 1860 campaign as a contest between one resolutely antislavery party and three opponents that either explicitly endorsed or implicitly condoned the expansion of slavery. Party leaders recognized opposition to slavery as the issue that bound together the disparate elements that had form-

ed the Republican organization in 1855, and agitated against the Slave Power even more fiercely after the execution of John Brown. Brown's courage in captivity, despite his recognized instability, and the refusal of Virginia to recognize any appeal for mercy turned opinion in Northampton dramatically away from an early condemnation of his insurrection, making Brown a martyr and more importantly making the antislavery struggle a cause worth martyrdom in many minds. Addressing a meeting to memorialize Brown on the day of his execution, Henry S. Gere upheld a higher moral law which rendered the statutes violated by Brown trivial if not unjust. Despite such forceful opinions, public feeling in Northampton was cautious and uncertain as secession followed Lincoln's election and war seemed very possible. One leading Congregationalist clergyman warned that disunion might be the work of Providence, not to be disputed through violence, and others may have felt not so much an eagerness for battle as a visceral dread of a great national catastrophe as Lincoln sent ships to resupply Fort Sumter.⁶

When the South started the war, such anxiety evaporated. The decision of Providence had been for war, Rev. Dr. Eddy declared during a sermon attended by uniformed volunteers in the front pews of his church, and "the God of battles would fight for freedom and right." Another Congregationalist minister equated secession with anarchy, and demanded that it be crushed at once. On a sterner note yet, a Baptist preacher thundered that all Americans were responsible for the war; "We have become corrupt. We have been too obedient to party, at

the expense of principle; have been led by political demagogues; have bowed to the behests of slavery, the sum of all villanies, and now God is to punish us for it." Northampton's Catholic priest urged his Irish parishioners to remain true to their adopted country, but recommended that, should it become necessary for them to enlist, they should raise a company and elect officers of their own.⁷

Beyond the pulpit, the news inspired outbreaks of patriotic fervor. Few supporters of secession could be found, and those would come around, the Gazette supposed, once patriotic feeling overcame political ill will. Patriotism in April 1861 was non-partisan and classless. Local banks contributed \$20,000 each to a war loan. The Selectmen procured cloth for uniforms and distributed it equitably to the town's merchant tailors and to a committee of seventy-five patriotic ladies. A Democratic merchant promised to continue paying a clerk's salary while he went to war, and a local doctor offered free service to soldiers' families for the duration. Workmen at William Clapp's foundry raised a flagpole and had to order a flag from Boston after the local supply ran out. Teamsters pinned the Stars and Stripes to horses' ears. Prisoners reportedly clamored to be allowed to enlist.⁸

Almost immediately, the town's militia company, one of the oldest in the state, offered its services to the government as Company C of the Tenth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers, accepting new men to bring the unit to size. The proper outfitting of the company became a matter of mass con-

cern, expressed in a crowded war meeting convened on April 18. A committee appointed at that time to solicit funds for the support of the troops presented its recommendations at another meeting on April 26 and provoked the first controversy of the war. After consulting with several unnamed leading citizens, the committee, led by Erastus Hopkins, a professional politician and Republican spokesman, recommended that \$10,000 be raised for the equipment of the volunteers and to provide for their dependents, by a tax assessment on property.⁹

The ensuing debate focused explicitly on the legality of the proposed tax. Superior Court Judge Charles Dewey reminded the meeting with some reluctance that state law denied towns the right to levy taxes for this purpose. Enos Parsons, an old Whig with five sons ready to fight, agreed that the tax would be illegal, and preferred voluntary fundraising through a public subscription. Against this opposition, Probate Judge and moderator Samuel F. Lyman asserted that "in time of war the law is silent." The committee was well aware of the legal problem, Lyman said, but was appealing to the people rather than to a court; when an enemy had his hand around your throat, Lyman declared, "it did not become us, as good and loyal citizens, to stand too long upon niceties." "Not an Irishman in town," Hopkins added, no matter how mean, presumably, would hesitate to pay the tax.¹⁰

Other speakers adopted more intimidating notes. Hopkins himself said that, while no one should be subjected to indignities for refusing to pay, the lot of such a person would be

"most unpleasant and unenviable." William Allen, Jr., a minister's son, claimed that he would like "to hear of the man who refused to pay his proportion of this tax, and to look at him, to determine what manner of man he was." A "Shop Row" businessman opined that "the heart of the man who should refuse to pay his proportion would be blacker than Cain's ever was." Osmyn Baker, a Republican attorney, declared himself ready to do away with legal forms to encourage public sacrifice, and wondered if those opposed to the tax meant to demoralize the volunteers. "Vote the tax," he advised the assembly, "and leave the responsibility to God!" Sherry applause punctuated all these remarks, and the meeting voted unanimously for the tax.¹¹

The debate over compulsory versus voluntary fundraising would persist throughout the war, raising the question of what voters felt to be at stake in the decision. Taxation, while compulsory, was thought to be fair in distributing the burden of sacrifice among all citizens on the basis of wealth. In 1861 one supporter of the tax argued that a voluntary subscription would be both impractical and unfair because it placed the burden disproportionately on a few men. Such an argument presumed that, in a voluntary subscription, the wealthy would be expected to pay a proportionately larger share of expenses. That they could is borne out by the surviving subscription records of 1862, 1864, and 1865. With few exceptions, the largest subscribers to the 1862 fund paid more into it than they paid in taxes the year before.¹²

By 1862 many citizens felt that the wealthy, the men of "Shop Row" especially, had not yet done their fair share for the cause. Some may have recognized that a flat tax such as the 1861 assessment (\$3.50 per thousand dollars in property), while ostensibly egalitarian, was regressive in effect, as the less well-off had less ready cash on hand for such purposes. A further grievance questioned the fairness of tax assessments on property when many wealthy citizens concentrated their wealth in stocks and bonds, which went unassessed by the town.¹³

With the connivance of state government, Northampton arrived at a kind of middle ground on this issue. The first voluntary subscription in 1862 was deemed a loan to the town, on the understanding that the legislature would ultimately empower towns to repay such loans through a tax. In 1863 Massachusetts assumed all local funds for the payment of bounties to volunteers, authorizing the towns to pay their shares through a tax; subscribers would be credited the amount they paid, and would be refunded the balance if their contribution exceeded their assessment. Taxation finally became a threatened expedient in the event that subscribers failed to fulfill their pledges. While the town achieved a compromise on policy, consensus on the principle behind the debate remained elusive. The volunteer spirit, combined with the expectations of the paternalist ethic, placed pressure on the wealthy to act as public benefactors. The especially spontaneous spirit of 1861 may have made a more compulsory policy seem volunteerist as well, so long as burdens were seen as shared.¹⁴

After properly outfitting the volunteers, the community's next priority was to provide for their dependents. Although the state would ultimately assume responsibility for all dependents, allowing towns to apply for reimbursement for expenses, immediate responsibility for dependent families remained with the town. In Massachusetts aged and infirm parents as well as dependent siblings could receive aid along with wives and children. This amounted to a form of social insurance for the volunteer, that he could supplement by sending home part of his pay. Social insurance and public support of morale were the community's obligations; the incentive to enlist was presumed to be provided, in 1861 at least, by the individual volunteer.¹⁵

Recent studies contend that at this early point in the war communities provided volunteers primarily from their own ranks. Volunteers were young men who could be spared from the office, the factory, or the farm for the cause, the "Sons," in one historian's usage, as opposed to the outsiders and transients who were the unfamiliar "Soldiers" of the latter part of the war. The evidence from Northampton neither supports nor effectively refutes such an assertion. Out of 106 officers and men in Company C, only forty-five claimed residency in Northampton, and only twenty-three of those were born in town. Most of the remainder came from elsewhere in Hampshire County; very few, by comparison, were immigrants. Many of the apparent outsiders would most likely have been veterans of the militia company, which represented much of the county.

At the same time, some primary evidence suggests that the town recruited to some extent from a transient population. The Selectmen's annual report for 1861 noted a record rate of overnight occupancy of the poor house that year. Captain Marsh of Company C presented the town with a bill for compensation for ten volunteers' board, paid from his own pocket, for periods ranging from ten days to seven weeks; four of these men came from out of town. Did these men need lodging because they had left work to enlist, or because they had no work? Were the occupants of the poor house looking for work, arriving to enlist, or just passing through? Every volunteer is assigned a trade, however vague, in the regimental histories; how many held a steady job before enlisting?¹⁶

Patriotism is an intangible quality not included in the enlistment rolls. Historians confronted with the question of volunteerism are caught between two extremes, one idealistic, one determinist. Companies can be broken down by age or occupation in an attempt to find a decisive motivating factor other than sincere enthusiasm for the war. Broad assumptions of widespread patriotism might ignore circumstances that might leave some men more or less free to enlist than others. Business cycles, for instance, would periodically make different occupational cohorts available for service. At the same time, the 1861 volunteers as a whole enlisted more spontaneously than succeeding companies would, regardless of where individuals came from and how they stood economically. The community responded to the first rush of enlistments in Northampton with

as much enthusiasm as those towns where the volunteers were more clearly the native "Sons," with whom the community might share a more intimate bond. Northampton's enthusiasm suggests that patriotic feeling in all communities may be tied less to the supposed intimate bonds between citizens and soldiers than to the patriotic feeling of the moment and an abiding sense of obligation to contribute as a community to resolving the national crisis. A volunteer spirit can be attributed to the community as a whole that can be seen, in Northampton's case, to be in decline well before the town would send the largest numbers of its own men to the war.¹⁷

Public enthusiasm for the idea of a local militia diminished most rapidly. No longer compulsory, militia companies in many places had taken on some of the characteristics of social organizations. Once Company C had left town, a remaining group of able-bodied men proposed forming a new independent militia with Luke Lyman as their drill instructor. The Register of Probate had served as Captain of the Wide-Awakes in 1860, and already served as a military instructor to students at Amherst College when he took up the task of obtaining up-to-date weapons for the new company. Visiting Hartford to deal directly with the manufacturers, he found that both Sharpes and Samuel Colt were backlogged months into the future with government orders. After this disappointment, the new company suspended operations until August, when it re-organized as the "Lyman Guards."¹⁸

By then the new militia found public support gravely lack-

ing. Intending to remain independent of the army and the state, the Lymans acted exclusively as a drill company while anticipating a government supply of rifles. That proving hopeless, the militia purchased their weapons individually, resolving to keep them unless the town elected to make up the cost. Getting uniforms proved even more difficult. Only in March 1862 did a local merchant tailor provide the company with a "neat and tasteful pattern" within "the range of hard time prices." The town had been expected to make up the cost here also, but had again proven niggardly in providing for its own. This set the tone for the remainder of the Lyman 'Guards' existence, described in retrospect as "a three years' campaign, sustained against the opposition of practically everybody."¹⁹

A historian of the idea of courage in the Civil War notes that local militias of able-bodied civilians often faced derisive accusations of cowardice; these same men, on the other hand, felt at pains to prove themselves manly and courageous. Volunteerism had made it easier to see the local militia as principally a social organization than as a genuine community defense force. The war made it more difficult yet to see the formation of a wartime home guard as more than a band of men playing at soldiering when they were perfectly fit for real fighting. The Lyman Guards tried to juggle a sense of obligation to service with a sense of obligation to their businesses, and found that the militia no longer provided an acceptable middle ground.²⁰

In September 1861 Luke Lyman left his Guards to become a

lieutenant colonel in the Twenty-Seventh Regiment. Seventy-four Northampton men joined him, enlisting into several different companies, making up a majority in none. That Northampton provided more men than in April can be explained in part by reference to the occupational breakdown of the September volunteers. While in April the town had provided seven farmers from its cohort of residents, twenty seven enlisted in September and October. Whether these were farm owners, farmers' sons or brothers, or farm laborers, as was progressively more likely, their work was out of season once the harvest was in. Of all men in the Spring 1861 group, only three were "mechanics;" nineteen mechanics enlisted into the Twenty-Seventh. By comparison, only two clerks enlisted into the new companies, while ten had volunteered for Company C. The mechanics may also have been subject to a business cycle that left them available for service at that particular time. Ultimately military demand would conflict with local business cycles, and the town would find itself suffering a labor shortage.²¹

While the town presumably sent more of its own men to war that Autumn, public enthusiasm for the new volunteers fell far short of the initial fervor. In the pages of the Gazette, Henry S. Gere was moved to ask:

Have our citizens ever considered how little they have done for the company which recently left this town for the war? Did they provide them uniforms? Did they give them testaments and publicly bid them God-speed? Did they crowd about the depot as they left and give them a parting cheer?

As for the men so sadly ignored:

The greater portion of those who went from this town are poor, and but few of them have a cent in their pockets. They will not be paid by the government under three months. We understand that there are some articles, such as towels, combs, &c., which are not furnished by the government, that they really are in need of.²²

Amidst apparent public apathy and urgent need, the work of Northampton's patriotic women stood out for persistence and tangible results. From an early point in the war, Northampton ladies collected hospital supplies, linens, and other necessities for delivery to the Sanitary Commission in Washington and eventual distribution to local soldiers. Financial support came from individual donations and collections taken at local churches. The original volunteers in this effort organized themselves as the Ladies Army Aid Society, collecting up to \$2,000 yearly as the war went on, and inspiring a working class ladies' society in Florence.²³

Military setbacks in 1861 caused concern at home. In October Rev. Dr. Eddy blamed Northern failures on "our irregular political system" of parties. While hoping that General McClellan might prove an American Cromwell capable of instilling a crusading fervor in the army, he criticized other generals' incompetence and argued that emancipation should become the Union rallying cry. Antiparty feeling found deceptive expression in a Republican-managed "Union" movement which preached an end to party spirit, but in practice intended deference to the Republicans, and by no means a division of political spoils. The onus of partisanship fell on the opposition.²⁴

The war played havoc with the usual domestic priorities. An-

icipating further war expenses, the March 1862 town meeting made retrenchment the order of the day. Republicans and Democrats, farmers and professionals alike voted to cut \$4,000 from a proposed \$18,000 appropriation, eliminating \$1,000 from the school budget alone.²⁵

By March 1862 seventy-four families received monthly aid payments out of a population of 1,448 families. Through March 1862 Northampton spent a total of \$2,243 on soldiers' families. By April 1862 the soldiers of the Twenty-Seventh Regiment alone had sent home almost \$4,000. Between October 1861 and April 1862 fifteen Northampton men enlisted in different companies of the Thirty First Massachusetts Volunteers; more than half were farmers, again reflecting the seasonal cycle. Recruiting in town had dwindled to virtual inactivity by the time the War Department issued General Order 33, discontinuing active recruitment of volunteers. That order rested on a mistaken conviction that General McClellan's invasion of Virginia would end the war. When his invasion stalled, then collapsed after the Seven Days' Battles amidst repeated appeals for reinforcements, the War Department reversed itself. Recruiting officers found themselves caught between the contradictory arguments that, on one hand, the generals had the war won, and on the other, that they didn't know what they were doing.²⁶

The government finally answered the army's pleas by announcing a new call for three years' enlistments and assigning every state, county, and town a quota of volunteers to be provided. While quotas had been imposed, technically speaking, in

1861, most communities had already exceeded them by the time they were assigned. The immediate imposition of a quota, a community goal, provided the impetus for a revival in Northampton of mass activism. A mass rally on July 11 appointed a committee to report their recommendations for fundraising at a special town meeting the next day. Erastus Hopkins reported the committee's recommendation that only \$3,500 be raised by unspecified means. Enos Parsons immediately proposed a \$7,500 appropriation; others asked for still more. Hopkins argued that the war was almost over, and that therefore the smaller sum would be adequate. Any greater appropriation, he added, would disproportionately burden a wealthy few. The Free Press subsequently accused the committee of hypocrisy, claiming that while Hopkins made such protests his allies were planning to impose another tax assessment.²⁷

Lewis Maltby, a gentleman landowner from New Jersey, rose to express his disgust with the debate and the entire object of the meeting. "Here you sit debating whether you will pay \$30 or \$75 to poor Irishmen to fight for you!" he fumed, suggesting that if the volunteer spirit in the North had fallen to such a level the war was already lost. He had heard of no volunteers from town lately, and in particular had heard of none from "the leading men" or from "Shop Row." To shame them all Maltby asked for someone willing to volunteer then and there; when two men rose simultaneously, he offered both fifty dollars from his bank account. A third man rose to explain that government misconduct and equivocation on emancipa-

tion discouraged volunteerism; Maltby assured him that the South's aggression had sealed slavery's fate.²⁸

Enos Parsons' amendment, the \$7,500 appropriation, carried the meeting. A subsequent decision raised the figure to \$10,000 and explicitly stated that the money would be raised by voluntary subscription. Northampton now offered each new recruit \$100 upon enlistment, to add to the \$25 federal bounty and one month's advance pay, or \$13. With the town's obligation to the war effort increasingly becoming a monetary one, public opinion now favored a more ostensibly voluntary system of support that subtly urged the wealthy to lead in contributions. The first man to sign the subscription roll, the banker John Clarke, set the standard by subscribing for \$1,000; "Good old Uncle John!" the Gazette responded.²⁹

Despite the cumulative inducements of bounties, advance pay, family aid, and a final mustering-out bounty down the line, the press expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of enlistments. The effectiveness and propriety of bounties had been questioned from the first. Maltby implied that bounties tended to attract a lesser quality of person, and represented the failure of genuine volunteer spirit. The Gazette thought bounties an appropriate inducement for the poor, but complained that Northampton's was inadequate in comparison to the \$200 offered in Springfield and the \$125 offered in Amherst. The lack of a time limit after which volunteers were ineligible for bounties appeared to impede rapid enlistment; farmers reportedly advised their laborers to wait until the harvest was in be-

fore enlisting, as long as the bounty remained in effect. The Free Press went so far as to suggest that any employer making such an argument might deserve a prison term, illustrating the frustration or plain impatience felt by many opinion leaders. Public rallies fell short of the press' expectations. A band concert drew an appreciative audience, but few volunteers. A rally attended by General Anderson of Fort Sumter fame was judged a fiasco by the Free Press, if only because a political enemy addressed it.³⁰

Despite these dismal reports, the Gazette published a list of ninety volunteers on August 12. Ultimately the town would send ninety-nine men into Company G of the Thirty-Seventh Regiment. Of these, eighty-one are listed in the regimental record as Northampton residents. At this time, considerations of residency and nativity became very important. If an enlistee could prove himself a native or longtime resident of a given town, he could be credited to that town's quota regardless of where he enlisted. Five men in Company G are listed as residents of Springfield, but claimed to be Northampton men who enlisted in the larger town to collect the larger bounty. At the regimental camp in Pittsfield they transferred into the Northampton company, demanding the town's bounty on top of what they received in Springfield if they were to be credited to the shire town's quota. The outcome of this affair is unknown, but the incident illustrates both the increased concern with claiming soldiers as native sons and the bidding wars between communities occasioned by the imposition of quotas.³¹

Of the ninety-nine men in Company G, thirty-four were either farmers or farm laborers; some men listed as farmers in the regimental record were listed as laborers or as engaged in other trades in the Gazette's list. Such discrepancies merely make explicit the ambiguity in the status of listed farmers mentioned earlier. As the harvest wasn't yet in, the bounty probably succeeded in attracting men off the farms, contrary to the expectation of the press. More than one tenth of the new soldiers were carpenters, which suggests a depression in the building trades, given the environment of retrenchment in the town. The appeal of a bounty, along with soldier's pay and family aid, for men whose livelihood depended on demand in any event should not be underestimated. Gradually the new recruiting drive siphoned off any remaining theoretically expendable workforce.³²

The list of volunteers published in the Gazette does not perfectly match the regimental record, chiefly because more men enlisted after August 12, but also because twenty-one of the ninety men in the paper either joined other companies or, in the case of nineteen of them, joined none. Signing the enlistment roll was a public act, often performed at mass rallies with the town's leading men present and one's peers all about. These nineteen men either felt compelled or at some point felt sufficiently confident to put their names on the list, but then failed to abide by their public promise, their failure becoming a matter of public record.³³

Northampton's newspapers may have printed lists of volun-

teers and lists of subscribers with such a purpose of public exposure in mind. Such lists served both as examples to others and as reminders to the volunteer or the subscriber of the obligation that had been undertaken. Henry S. Gere, for one, had already proven himself a master creator and manipulator of public opinion, playing a leadership role in the Wide-Awakes and in the regular Republican organization. A native of nearby Williamsburg, he had been involved with newspapers since his teens, first as a Free-Soiler, then very briefly as an American, finally as the predominant opinion leader in the town. Gere's was the smaller paper of the two that merged in 1858, but his became the editorial voice. At age thirty-four he was still of military age.³⁴

A second call for troops followed immediately after the first, with a new quota of nine-months' volunteers assigned to every community. Communities now understood that failure to meet the new quota would subject them to a federally-supervised draft, but at the same time were often left uncertain of their actual quotas. Different figures were published almost weekly as new authoritative quotas, leaving a town either dramatically ahead or dangerously behind. Failure would represent a communal failure of the volunteer spirit, and a compulsory draft would become an occasion of communal shame.

At a public meeting to encourage nine-months' enlistments on August 20, Gere stunned the audience by signing his name on the enlistment roll. Any man who would not volunteer now, he blustered, deserved to be drafted. Gere intended his

enlistment to set an example to local businessmen; if fifteen of the younger class would join him, Gere claimed, that would in turn set a powerful example to "our clerks, mechanics and laboring men." Hedging his own commitment somewhat, he warned that if the town fell short of its quota, and a draft became necessary, he would not report for duty, since his purpose in enlisting had been to prevent a draft. This unfortunate conditioning of Gere's public commitment immediately altered the terms under which citizens signed their names to what he would shortly publish as a "Roll of Honor."³⁵

Gere put pressure on the town again in an address to the Lyman Guards. "Several of our wealthiest citizens" not having done what he considered their fair part in fundraising, he invited the militia to shame the magnates by contributing the needed funds themselves. Gere proved hard to please. The militia raised \$1,675 on August 23, but Gere expected at least \$5,000. Five volunteers signed the roll at the same meeting; Gere thought twenty or thirty should have signed.³⁶

A torchlight parade on September 13 was the climax of the propaganda drive. Volunteers, militia, and volunteer firefighters marched through the illuminated streets, pausing to serenade some of the wealthiest citizens at their homes. Ladies cheered from their windows, or gathered at the home of Christopher Clarke, "Uncle John" Clarke's nephew and a prosperous shoe merchant in his own right, to greet the hometown heroes. The agitated crowd went home that night to hear "the good news of the second battle of Bull Run, which was received in town

by telegraph that evening."³⁷

That dubious news had not been amended by the time the Gazette published its "Roll of Honor" of 110 prospective volunteers on September 16. Gere's name appeared seventh in a presumably chronological list of volunteers, but his example had a double-edged effect. Of the men listed, sixty-three joined Company C of the Fifty-Second Regiment, five joined other companies, and forty-three joined nothing. Christopher Clarke, prominent in the Republican party, in the Wide-Awakes, and in the Society for the Detection of Thieves and Robbers, signed his name, but added "or sub," as did other merchants, none of whom went to war. The Holyoke Bank promised one man; whether he proved to be an employee or not is unknown. Two merchants did report for duty, but one was a former lieutenant of the Twenty-Seventh who received a captain's commission. For his part, with the quota met, Gere left town with the regiment, making his way to New Orleans, where he was made postmaster for the military district.³⁸

In time twenty-seven more men enlisted in the new company, making its strength upon departure ninety men. Of these, seventy-seven were Northampton residents and forty were natives. Only eight recruits were immigrants, reflecting a consistent underrepresentation of the foreign-born. Twenty-seven were farmers or farm laborers, all but four of whom were residents; six carpenters joined, but none were natives. The only "Shop Row" element to respond to Gere's example were the clerks, fourteen of whom enlisted, eleven of them natives.³⁹

In plain numerical terms, Northampton sent far more men to the front in 1862 than it had sent off with fanfare and emotion in 1861. The imposition of quotas and the threat of the draft had made volunteerism more consciously a community duty rather than a spontaneous impulse, and compelled the town to recruit more vigorously among its own than had been necessary before. The town's opinion leaders took the lead in the effort, demonstrating a disregard for the needs of the local economy when weighed against the national purpose. The real effect of their activity was the rapid exhaustion of the town's expendable manpower. What appeared to be an approximation of the volunteer spirit of 1861 proved, on observation, to be far less spontaneous, and more subject to pressure from above.

Public pressure had also exposed tensions within the town's elites. Agitation by men like Maltby and in the newspapers suggested a cleavage separating the opinion leaders and the true patriots from an apathetic moneyed elite. Gere's enlistment created a frustrated expectation that the merchant class should be as ready as their fellow citizens to sacrifice their livelihoods for the cause. To compensate, men like Christopher Clarke whose patriotism had been rendered suspect took leading roles in the organization of the bounty fund. By mid-October Clarke and his colleagues had collected \$7500 from subscribers for distribution to the volunteers; most of the money returned with the committee to be distributed to volunteers' families. Neither newspaper then found cause to suggest that Clarke belonged in uniform himself. The unequal

contributions of the different classes, as universally recognized, to Northampton's contingent at the front would be remembered, however, at every subsequent discussion of the community's role in contributing to the war.⁴⁰

Volunteers' families found bounties, advance pay, and state aid especially helpful in a period of drastic inflation. Higher tariffs, scarcity caused by preemptive government claims on goods, increased demand for hard currency as its supply shrank, and the subsequent resort to paper money drove prices on a variety of necessities, groceries, raw materials and finished goods upward from twenty-five to over three hundred per cent. For a time even the expanding volume of devalued paper currency was inadequate for businesses purposes, and several stores in Northampton issued "shinplasters" as temporary currency. Individuals tried to use railroad tickets for the same purpose. At the same time, federal contracts brought money into the town. Most prominently, by the end of 1862 the Bay State works shaped, polished, rifled, and proved gun barrels from Worcester, producing seventy-five daily and only needing a more regular supply of imported Marshall iron to produce more. In general the press reported local businesses to be doing well despite a decline in male population in 1861.⁴¹

Wartime losses in the local workforce would soon be made up. Despite the net loss of adult males in 1861, the total population grew by seventy-two that year. In 1862, according to Ansel Wright's annual census, the town grew by 433,

broken down into ninety-one new families, 199 more adult females, and 239 more adult males. Out of 262 births in 1862, 152 were of foreign parentage, setting the pattern for the duration. Most new residents settled in Florence, Leeds, or in other industrial districts, as increased demand for labor attracted working women and more men than the town had sent to war. The opening of the Florence Sewing Machine Company in 1861 alone created many new positions to be filled during four years of rapid expansion of output. By March 1863 the press reported "an unusual scarcity" of farm labor, made up for by the importation of Canadian laborers who could be worked for twenty dollars a month plus board; other interests may have resorted to similar means to satisfy demand and expand the population.⁴²

In closing the books on 1862, the Selectmen reported that the town had raised nearly \$22,000 for volunteers' bounties, and had a surplus of over \$2,500. In 1862 the town had disbursed \$8,755 for aid to soldiers' families; 145 families had received aid at some point in the year, and 113 families received aid at the time of the report, approximately seven per cent of all families in Northampton. Most aid money had been donated by banks or had come from the Smith Charities fund. Appropriations for public works rose in 1863 after the conservative retrenchment of the previous year, much of the increase coming from a \$9,000 appropriation for a new high school. Gradually the town was accommodating itself to operating at a deficit.⁴³

In June 1863, as the Confederacy invaded Pennsylvania, Northern communities fell under the provisions of the Enrollment Act, which took the responsibility for organizing new troops out of the hands of the states and authorized the federal government to use drafted men to fill up existing companies at the discretion of the War Department. Massachusetts and other states lost the right to organize new regiments for the time being, and all communities faced a federal draft, supervised by provost marshals responsible to the Adjutant General in Washington. In explaining the new policy to Governor John Andrew, the Secretary of War explicitly discarded the volunteer principle; to accept it was to grant the volunteer the right to enlist where he pleased, which went against the intent of the Act. To grant a volunteer the right to choose the unit in which he'd serve would only exacerbate the conditions that had made the Act necessary.⁴⁴

The draft of July 1863 could not be prevented, although in many places rioting postponed it. In Northampton, Ansel Wright reported that as of June 1863 the town had 1,368 men in the two classes of men obliged to enroll for the draft. Of these, 955 fell into the first class, all men aged twenty to thirty-five and all single men aged thirty-five to forty-five. Of these, 257 currently served or had seen service. The remainder consisted of 487 citizens, 132 unnaturalized aliens, forty-four men of "doubtful alienage," and eleven black men. Single men were the majority, outnumbering married men by 560 to 395.⁴⁵

As the telegraph reported a wild sequence of events, from the victory at Gettysburg to the escape of General Lee, from the fall of Vicksburg to the outbreak of violent riots in New York, Luke Lyman returned to Northampton, having resigned from his regiment over an unspecified conflict with fellow officers. Lyman immediately resumed his duties as Register of Probate and renewed his relationship with the Lyman Guards, and observed firsthand the panic that swept through the town. As eligible men throughout the Ninth Congressional District awaited the drawing of names in Greenfield, news came first of the carnage in New York, then of fatalities in Boston, then of unchecked vandalism and looting in Troy, New York. Lyman's view of the subsequent hysteria at home, expressed in a private letter to a fellow soldier, suggests the extent of his own alienation and cynicism as much as the troubled atmosphere in Northampton:

The riot in New York frightened every body and all said we should have one over here on the night of the draft. The old grannies ran up and down the street saying there was surely going to be trouble, doing just the thing to create a disturbance. On [the morning of July 20] it was at its height. News came that Cheapside bridge had been burnt, several buildings in Greenfield burnt or destroyed and the most extravagant rumors. You can imagine all the grannies were anxious to know if the Lyman Guard was ready for assisting in quelling the horrible riot which was to be. You may believe I enjoyed it. I of course "having seen service!" was consulted. I was just wicked enough to rather help it on, that is, say something which would be likely to increase their fears. Imagine me sitting on the Court House steps [overlooking "Shop Row"] and watching the members of the different squads. Here is Sam Wills, Sam Lyman, Dr. Fisk and one or two men of that style in one, H. Dick, Joe Kellogg and some of the younger grannies in another. Starkweather of

the "honorable board" was going from one to the other assuring them everything was "all right" and not to be frightened. Yes, say they, "but so and so's Irish girl says that something terrible was going to happen and we must be prepared." A paper was started pledging the signers to meet at a given signal, the ringing of the Court House Bell (don't tell any body what the signal was!) and fall in with the remains of the Lyman Guards and fight to the death, the brave fellows.⁴⁶

The Lyman Guards, commanded since Lyman's departure by the bookseller Henry Childs, had been reduced to little more than a skeleton organization by the enlistment drives of 1862. With some public encouragement, but none of a material kind, the militia gradually rebuilt itself, operating at a rare surplus in the meantime, and now found itself urgently looked to for the defense of the community:⁴⁷

They breathed easier when it was known that the Lyman Guards' muskets had been hid away out of the reach of the mob, and 600 cartridges ready made. The muskets were carried away by three of us one dark night, hid in a room not a thousand yards from [Lyman's home or office]. The cartridges were made in my office on Sunday [July 19]. Think of that and you will no longer doubt that we were a frightened people. . . . Well, the muskets and cartridges remain where they were put and nary a Poor Paddy has felt the effect of them. All now [July 24] is quiet as ever. The [Connecticut River Railroad guards?] their bridges every night [with the Guards' pistols]. So I think they (the bridges or pistols, as you please) are safe. A secret police patrol the town every night and I feel perfectly safe. I occasionally hear picket fire, but that don't disturb me in my quiet home.⁴⁸

Hindsight suggests that Northampton had little to fear. New York, Boston, Troy, and Greenfield all held drawings for the draft and saw disturbances; Northampton did not and had none. The town's Irish had remained aloof from the war effort, their spokesmen saying they only awaited the opportunity to

enlist in Irish regiments, although very few did, but there is no newspaper evidence of antiwar feeling in the Irish neighborhoods. Northampton also lacked a widespread or politically powerful antiwar movement within which any Irish grievances might gain legitimacy. Denied any proportionate role in public life, possibly lacking political organization amongst themselves, the Northampton Irish made no known attempt to challenge the local establishment and its policies. Their apparent separateness, added to the popular reputation of the Irish for drunken violence, may have served to heighten local fears, at least among the sensitive men of "Shop Row," beyond good reason. Importantly, however, Northampton once again believed in community self-defense. The North had been invaded. The government had just taken away both the personal sovereignty of the individual volunteer and the communal sovereignty assumed by the town through the recruitment and support of soldiers. Insurrection had exploded throughout the North. The immediate crisis safely past, this reactionary assertion of communal sovereignty, the new impulse to self-defense, found a familiar expression in a revived temperance movement the next winter.

During December 1863, Rev. Dr. Eddy delivered a series of sharp attacks on unauthorized liquor dealers in town, complaining that the old liquor laws had gone unenforced. In response to his and other preachers' assaults on the liquor trade, a committee headed by Enos Parsons nominated twenty-five leading men at a mass meeting to act as compilers of evidence against the unauthorized dealers. Offenders would be

given a week's notice and an opportunity to escape prosecution if they swore to sell only ale and ciders. Over the New Years' holiday the sheriff's office confiscated the stocks of four illegal liquor sellers; at the time there were believed to be eighty rum-shops in town. Prosecution was supplemented by suasion in an effort to compel the seller to change his ways by depriving him of his market. Opponents of the movement were blamed for a mysterious fire that damaged the Baptist church that December. Many felt similar efforts should be made against the tobacco growers, but the tobacco interest in Northampton was numerous and organized, and opposition to them was considered a fringe movement. At this time, a People's Lyceum determined after a public debate that intemperance was a greater moral threat to America than slavery. One year later, opinion would again demand strict measures against the liquor sellers. With the decline of volunteerism, with the later commitment to entirely pay Northampton's way out of the war, came a turning inward and a revived concern, amidst the dislocating effects of war, with moral regulation.⁴⁹

By the time of the temperance revival the draft had become a dead letter for the enrolled men of July. A blindfolded blind man drew 216 Northampton names, the town's quota, in Greenfield. Upon proper notification, these men reported to Greenfield for medical examinations. Those determined capable of bearing arms had several options for avoiding service. Support of aged, infirm, or bereaved family members would earn a drafted man an exemption, as would proof that two brothers

already served in the armed forces. Proof that the drafted man lived elsewhere exempted him from contributing to Northampton's quota, as did proof that the man was an unnaturalized alien. Most controversially, the draftee could fulfill his obligation by either providing a substitute soldier at his own expense or paying \$300 as a commutation fee.⁵⁰

Controversy followed from the assumption that the options of commutation and substitution made it easier for the wealthy to avoid service than it was for the poor. This feeling had in part motivated the riots, and many Northern communities responded after the violence by appropriating money to pay the commutations of every drafted man. In Northampton, James R. Trumbull, editor of the Gazette in Gere's absence, expressed the apparent consensus of July 1863: "A more mischievous operation than that of appropriating money . . . to pay the commutation of drafted men, cannot be undertaken." A community's money was better spent, he added, on support for drafted men's families. The town appropriated money neither for commutations nor for family support, and the first draftees were left to their own devices for avoiding the war.⁵¹

Raising the money for commutations or for hiring substitutes may not have been as easy as prejudice suggested. Luke Lyman knew many young businessmen who would have to go into debt to pay the commutation. Thirty eligible men, unidentified by the press, formed a pool, each contributing \$100, from which any drafted man among them could take what he needed; when thirteen of them were drafted, their fund fell short of the

collective need. Substitutes could be had for less than commutations, \$300 serving as an effective price ceiling, but Luther Clark, an overseer at William Clark's paper mill, had to mortgage his home to raise the money, and considered himself robbed.⁵²

Of the 216 men, seventeen procured substitutes and thirty-seven paid commutations. Family connections exempted ten more, and five proved residency elsewhere. Two men proved themselves underage, and two overage. Forty-three more proved themselves unnaturalized aliens. The largest group by far, eighty-five men, obtained medical exemptions; these often depended upon some fakery and some connivance on the part of the examiner. Many doctors may have felt a communitarian obligation to keep local boys at home, and some may have had more material inducements as well. After others fell through the cracks, the town finally sent two men, one black, to the front. This occasioned no adverse comment in the local press.⁵³

Although towns were again allowed to recruit during the Autumn, Massachusetts law now prohibited the bounty wars that had broken out in 1863. "The success of recruiting, as well as justice, forbid the offering of increased bounties by private and local subscriptions," the state's General Order 32 of 1863 dictated, "competition between places will breed injustice, and . . . delay the recruitment, encouraging men to hold back for larger bids." Premiums provided by the state to towns for each new recruit or veteran reenlistee could not be used to augment the standard state bounty; any augmentation

by other means would be deducted from the state award. The state bounty then stood at \$300 for new recruits and \$400 for veterans, and the premium paid to towns stood at \$15 each and \$25 each respectively.⁵⁴

Most Northampton veterans who intended to reenlist did so while still at the front. In town, returned veterans set up recruiting offices but found that many of their recruits could not be credited to Northampton. A transient population may have been attracted by the booming economy even as others settled perhaps more permanently. The town's population grew by 572 in 1863, including 126 new families, 272 adult males, and 200 adult females. Population continued to grow most rapidly in the factory districts; whether individuals and families simply arrived seeking work or were recruited by the local businesses is unknown. The needs of families began to diminish as veterans returned home. By March 1864 the number of families receiving aid fell to eighty-eight from an 1863 high of 126. The town distributed over \$10,000 in aid to families that year, but also distributed \$21,703 in state tax revenues as compensation to subscribers to the 1862 bounty fund.⁵⁵

Through the Winter of 1863-4 the papers claimed that as many as eighty men had been recruited and credited to Northampton. No rolls of honor identified these men, however, and the government would inevitably distribute them to where it felt they were needed. Some can be found in the Tenth and Twenty-Seventh Regiments, but would be transferred elsewhere

once those units disbanded during 1864. Despite these claims, the town had fallen far short of its quota, and a second draft, though long delayed, seemed imminent. In March 1864 the town meeting authorized the Selectmen to borrow \$10,000 to procure volunteers from a Boston "substitute broker," who would be paid only when his men were officially mustered in. Preliminary negotiations suggested that the broker could provide at least sixty men, but after two months the bargain had not been sealed, the town remained fifty men short of its quota, and fifty men were drafted in Greenfield. Thirty-three of these men obtained medical exemption, but under new rules the exemptions would be made up for by a fresh draft. Accused of incompetence and betrayal of the public trust, the Selectmen protested that the broker wanted fifty dollars more per man than they had been authorized to offer, and that the town had done nothing to make up the difference.⁵⁶

Late in May a voluntary subscription fund was started committing the subscribers to raise money for "procuring volunteers to fill the deficiency existing by reason of exemptions in the late draft, to pay the commutations of accepted men, and to procure volunteers to apply on any future call." Separate sheets of this unofficial subscription were circulated from door to door in residential districts. Members of the fundraising committee took copies into factories and shops to catch employees and operatives during work. When one such sheet was brought to A. P. Critchlow's button factory in Leeds, Critchlow himself put his name at the top of the list for a

respectably large sum. His staff then committed themselves for lesser figures, and finally the operatives added their own minimal pledges, some as low as one dollar. On the Critchlow list several names are in a single recognizable hand, suggesting that several of those invited to subscribe their names were incapable of the act. The hierarchical dynamics of such an occasion, such as whether the operatives took their cues from the committeeman or from their boss, remain tantalizingly vague.⁵⁷

With the price of substitutes an important consideration, some subscribers expressed concern that their money should not be wasted. Some subscribers rephrased the terms of the commitment to make their payment conditional upon a minimal total subscription of \$15,000. On June 2 that figure became the formal goal of the drive, the object of which was now redefined as the payment of commutations only. The month before, the Selectmen had received a working-class petition asking that the town meeting adopt precisely that policy. Of the twenty-two names on the surviving page of the petition, ten can be traced back to the 1860 census, indicating a continued concern on the part of men who had so far avoided military service with the threat of conscription to their jobs, homes, and families. Of the ten identified, half were immigrants, appealing to town government at last for protection from a random selection and the dangers of war. A consensus had developed across class lines in favor of the policy condemned by the Gazette one year before.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, the choice between committing money or manpower to the war still troubled many people. Lewis P. Dudley, a private school teacher, pledged \$200 specifically "to provide a fighting man who will go to the war," for example. Veterans, returning home after three years in the army, proved most likely to view the new policies unfavorably. Seeing the Selectmen scurrying after substitutes in March 1864, and then hearing people wonder why veterans would want to reenlist, proved too much for one anonymous veteran who wrote a scathing answer for the Free Press. His fellow volunteers had a real sense of duty and patriotism, he claimed, and retained it yet, while that same sense had long since expired at home:

Then, too, you tried to dodge the responsibility [for serving your country] with that fore-ordination doctrine of the draft - let the draft (you said) elect and we will abide its decision. How did you answer the draft? It is needless to say, you shirked it by sending as your substitutes, jailbirds, the scum of cities, Cannucks and Indians; is such trash your representative? When substitutes failed you, you fell back to greenbacks - the call was for "blood" and you answered with "rags."59

The angry veteran had failed to notice the gradual shift in community priorities during the first three years of the war. In 1861 the communitarian purpose had been to punish rebellion, in 1862 to give of its own population as the crisis continued. Since 1863 the communitarian purpose had become self-preservation from depopulation and its drastic consequences for a labor-starved economy. The veteran did recognize that his fellow citizens now refused to match his early sacrifice with their own. Civilians seemed to think that the

scum of cities and so forth were as good as the old volunteers were for the purpose of getting shot; perhaps they thought the veterans no better than the Cannucks, Indians, and so forth they sent to replace them. Even as esteemed a veteran as Duke Lyman, who by war's end would be breveted a brigadier general for his work as the local Superintendent of Recruiting, confessed an occasional worry that his fellow citizens acclaimed him only to his face. Henry S. Gere, for his part, saw his service record regularly mocked in the pages of the rival newspaper. Veterans in general saw themselves as representatives of their community in a noble work, but discovered upon their return that that categorization, and the implicit community bond that followed from it, no longer applied.⁶⁰

Attempts to revive the volunteer spirit during 1864 proved abortive. An effort spearheaded by Lyman to create a hundred days' volunteer company was thwarted when the government reiterated its priority on filling existing regiments. When Massachusetts was again allowed to raise regiments, the town played no role in them. In December opinion leaders tried to convince potential volunteers that, with the war virtually over, they'd regret not having played a role in it. An opposite logic dictated that they would as deeply regret enlisting only to be killed at the end. As subscription lists circulated through town four times in four months in Spring and Summer, payments began to fall short of pledges, and Lyman's war committee recommended supplementing donations with a tax assessment. By November the committee remained in debt

to creditors from whom they had borrowed money needed to procure substitutes once commutations had been discontinued. An unofficial body, the committee lacked either the authority or the mandate to impose the proposed tax. Lyman, who despite his private feelings participated conscientiously in all aspects of public life, finally expressed his exhaustion in a public letter to the Gazette:

I venture to say that this matter has given [the committee] more trouble and vexation during the time they have been engaged in it, than their own private businesses, and they have seen so much indifference manifested by those who are liable [to the draft], that they will be very slow in taking another such job on their hands.⁶¹

The war now seemed to demand too much even of citizens' wallets. The repeated onslaught of subscription lists, reaching many in public places where perceived public obligations couldn't easily be escaped, had proven a burden to rich and poor alike, and had proven regressive, against the earlier volunteerist expectation, by straining the ready cash resources of many poorer people past their limits. Others now shared Luther Clark's sentiment that the government was robbing them, and with him made a disastrous attempt to get some of their money back.

Clark, the overseer who'd mortgaged his home in 1863, and three other men were persuaded by three conspirators to become bounty jumpers. The conspirators, a contractor at Bay State, a co-worker, and the landlord of a boarding house, convinced the four during December 1864 that they could go to New York to enlist with a substitute broker who'd pay the

conspirators \$650 per man. The enlistees would then travel to Elizabeth, New Jersey to be mustered in, and then desert at a convenient stop on the outbound route, where the conspirators would provide each man with civilian clothes, \$150 out of the broker's payment, and passage back to Northampton. The men wouldn't miss a day of work, they were told, and others had done it successfully before. On the train from Elizabeth, it turned out, there was neither a conspirator nor an understanding guard to be found. When Clark didn't return home at the promised time, his wife, who'd encouraged him, informed on the conspirators, who were arrested before word of mouth aroused any potentially violent reaction.⁶²

The defrauded men, who after appeals from home were put on light punishment detail at their camp, testified against the conspirators and two colleagues from New York at a preliminary hearing in January. Their evidence persuaded the authorities to hold the five defendants for trial at the June court. By June, however, everyone had lost interest in prosecuting the case, and all charges were dropped. By then the war had ended, the town had celebrated victory and mourned the murder of the President. In February the debts of Luke Lyman's war committee were paid through a voluntary subscription. In March, the People's Lyceum debated the proposition that "patriotism had done more to sustain the government than bounties and the enforcement of laws." While noting the important participants on both sides of the debate, and suggesting that the debate was rather heated, neither local paper

reported whether or not a verdict had been reached.⁶³

The Civil War was a nationalist war, asserting the existence of a single, irreducible national community bound by a universal moral law against an irrational defense of immoral local institutions. Most Northerners understood the war more as an enforcement of national authority than as an imposition of national order upon their own local institutions. The duration and intensity of the war, however, made necessary a consolidation of national authority throughout the Union, once the old, spontaneous volunteer spirit proved inadequate to the national purpose. Local governments acted increasingly as agents of the national government, fulfilling bureaucratic obligations, and compelling their citizens to fulfill more material obligations to the national cause.

Volunteerism in 1861 could practically be taken for granted. Southern aggression aroused a spontaneous urge to defend the Union and, implicitly, the home. One community's representatives joined other communities' representatives in a shared cause; the communal obligation was to outfit and send off their soldiers in a manner befitting their representatives, and to guarantee their families' welfare while they fought. Communal expectations obliged the wealthy to volunteer their resources, if not themselves, for this purpose. This old order experienced its crisis as the war made more and greater demands. Communal expectation, expressed in Northampton by Henry S. Gere and Lewis Maltby, demanded that the wealthy take

up arms to answer the growing need for men. The economic disruption that might have followed a wholesale enlistment of this class should not be underestimated. In Northampton's case, government contracts and increased demand required many business leaders to stay put, more or less glad to donate money, especially when it was reimbursed, but unable or unwilling to enlist.

Wartime communal expectations had to be accommodated to economic realities, forcing the issue of social justice. An eventual commitment to give drafted men the means to stay home, or to hire soldiers from elsewhere, may have been the elite's compensatory offering after failing to meet the harsher standard of shared sacrifice. This restored social harmony if it had been threatened, but alienated the veterans, who had acted according to the older standard. To them, town government appeared to acquiesce in a general failure of patriotism. The alienation expressed during the war may anticipate a divide separating those who served as representatives of the town and those at home who claimed the role of intermediaries between the town and the national government. Men like Gere and Luke Lyman, who as party stalwarts bridged this theoretical divide, could claim leadership as an elite above elites at a later time; during the war they could only express frustration with developments.

Draft rioters elsewhere acted most clearly in communal self-defense against the same consolidation, bureaucratization, and depersonalization of government recognized in Northampton.

The shire town's unrepresentative, elitist polity did not allow so vivid an expression of resistance to these trends, but experienced them equally. Ideologically more homogeneous than other places, Northampton could, to an extent limited by local concerns, adopt the nationalist agenda as its own. By the standard set in 1861, however, the town failed to make the most meaningful sacrifices for the national cause. The resort to substitutes and commutations, to "rags" in place of "blood," necessarily occasioned a moral crisis in a community committed to the extirpation of evil. The isolation and public apathy of the Irish, and the influx of alien elements into the factories, allowed a projection of that anxiety upon an internal enemy, depersonalized as the demon intemperance. By 1864 the campaign against rum-sellers was more vigorously and enthusiastically prosecuted than the war for the Union.

Increasingly, the community delegated the burden of wartime activism to a nascent local bureaucracy, foreshadowing the later rise of thoroughly bureaucratized, increasingly professionalized government and the further alienation of citizens from a professional political class. The failure of volunteerism during the Civil War foretold the end of an older sense of spontaneous solidarity, of a deeper sense of common citizenship. The returning volunteers' discovery that developments at home had rendered their sense of representation meaningless may be the best evidence available that, without a violent convulsion in protest, something deeply meaningful in antebellum community life had been lost.

NOTES

1. Shorter community studies concerning volunteerism, the home front experience, and veterans' issues are collected in Maris A. Vinovskis, ed., Toward A Social History of the American Civil War: Exploratory Essays (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). The major studies of enlistments and conscription are by Eugene C. Murdock: Patriotism Limited: The Civil War Draft and the Bounty System (Kent State, 1967) and One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North (Madison, 1971). A more recent study is James W. Geary, We Need Men: The Union Draft in the Civil War (De Kalb: Illinois Univ. Press, 1991). For draft resistance see Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance in American Society in the Age of the Civil War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989) and Grace Palladino, Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Region of Pennsylvania, 1840-1868 (Urbana: Illinois Univ. Press, 1990). Local studies include Emily J. Harris, "Sons and Soldiers: Deerfield, Massachusetts, and the Civil War," Civil War History 30 (1984): 157-71; Paul Jenkins, The Conservative Rebel: A Social History of Greenfield, Massachusetts (Greenfield, 1982), 117-28; Thomas R. Kemp, "Community and War: The Civil War Experience of Two New Hampshire Towns," in Vinovskis, *Ibid.*, 31-77.

2. Christopher Clark, The Rise of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 298-300.

3. Henry S. Gere, Reminiscences of Old Northampton (Northampton, 1902), 66-8; Hampshire Gazette and Northampton Courier (hereafter HG), 26 October 1858, 12 November 1859.

4. Gere, 119; Clark, 214; HG, 17 July 1860.

5. Gere, 63; J. Francis Manfredi, "Immigration to Northampton," in Tercentenary History Committee, The Northampton Book: Chapters from 300 Years in the Life of a New England Town (Northampton, 1954), 331-6.

6. HG, 12 November, 6 December 1859, 9 April 1861.

7. HG, 9, 23, 30 April 1861.

8. *Ibid.*

9. HG, 30 April 1861.

10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. The special tax assessment appeared in HG, 7 May 1861; lists of 1862 bounty fund subscribers appeared in HG, 5 August 1862 and in Northampton Free Press (hereafter NFP), 5 August 1862.
13. A late example of angry reaction to the public disclosure of income from stock holdings appears in HG, 3 January 1865. Bank and other stock holdings reported by the institutions to the Selectmen for the national war tax of 1863 can be found on Reel 148, Town Papers (microfilm), Forbes Library, Northampton.
14. NFP, 18 July 1862; HG, 23 December 1862, 16 June 1863.
15. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Adjutant General's Office, General Order 6, 17 March 1863 for an example of the range of family relations eligible for aid or compensation.
16. Clark, 317; Harris, 166-7; Joseph K. Newell, "Ours": Annals of 10th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers in the Rebellion (Springfield, 1875), 436-56; Alfred S. Roe, The Tenth Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1861-1864 (Springfield, 1909), 385-99; William H. Marsh to Selectmen of Northampton, ALS, 14 June 1861, Reel 157, Town Papers, Forbes; HG, 11 June 1861; NFP, 7 March 1862.
17. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1987), 224-5.
18. HG, 23, 30 April, 7 May, 6 August 1861.
19. HG, 23, 30 August 1861; NFP, 14 February 1862, 15 January 1864.
20. Linderman, 87-90.
21. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Adjutant General's Office, Massachusetts Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines in the Civil War (Norwood, 1931-2), III, 123-9.
22. HG, 8 October 1861.
23. HG, 13 August 1861, 12 February 1862, 29 November 1864; NFP, 16 December 1864.
24. HG, 1, 22 October 1861.
25. HG, 18 March 1862; NFP, 18 March 1862.

26. Geary, 8, 10; Mass. Soldiers, III, 403-9; HG, 24 December 1861, 4 February 1862; NFP, 7 January, 7 March, 18 April 1862.
27. Kemp, 44; HG, 15 July 1862; NFP, 15 July 1862.
28. HG, 15 July 1862; NFP, 15 July 1862.
29. HG, 22 July 1862; NFP, 18 July 1862.
30. HG, 15, 29, 1862; NFP, 15, 29 July, 1 August 1862.
31. HG, 12 August 1862; NFP, 2 September 1862.
32. Mass. Soldiers, III, 803-7; HG, 12 August 1862.
33. HG, 12 August 1862,
34. Gere, 16-27, 56-68.
35. HG, 26 August 1862.
36. HG, 2, 9, 16 September 1862.
37. HG, 16 September 1862.
38. Ibid.
39. Mass. Soldiers, IV, 592-6; J. F. Moors, History of the Fifty-Second Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers (Boston, 1893), xiii-xvii.
40. HG, 23 September, 7 October 1862.
41. HG, 21 October, 18, 25 November 1862.
42. HG, 7 January 1862, 20 January, 10, 17 March 1863; NFP, 29 January 1864, 24 January 1865.
43. HG, 10, 17 March, 5 May 1863; NFP, 12 May 1863.
44. Edwin P. Stanton to John A. Andrew, 30 July 1863, in War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1899), ser. III, vol. 3, 591-2.
45. HG, 23 June 1863.
46. Luke Lyman to Fred C. Wright, 24 July 1863, ALS, Civil War Collection, Historic Northampton.
47. HG, 14 October 1862; NFP, 9 January 1863.
48. Lyman to Wright, 24 July 1863, Historic Northampton.

49. HG, 1, 22, 29 December 1863, 12 January 1864, 14, 21 March 1865; NFP, 22 December 1863, 8 January 1864.

50. The Free Press published sample blank forms detailing the different exemption categories during July 1863. See also NFP, 4 December 1863.

51. HG, 28 July 1863.

52. Lyman to Wright, 24 July 1863, Historic Northampton; NFP, 21 July 1863. The Gazette reported in January 1865 that the bounty jumper Luther Clark had mortgaged his home to pay the commutation, but the official list of exemptions published in NFP, 4 December 1863 lists him as having procured a substitute; the money spent, and not how it was spent, probably influenced Clark the most.

53. NFP, 4 December 1863.

54. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Adjutant General's Office, General Order 32, 20 November 1863; General Order 40, 3 December 1863; General Order 4, 19 January 1864.

55. NFP, 27, 30 October, 29 December 1863, 15 March, 24 May 1864.

56. NFP, 24 March, 17, 31 May, 3 June 1864.

57. Northampton subscription list, "Rail Hill [Leeds]," May, 1864, Civil War Documents, Manuscript Collection, Forbes.

58. Northampton subscription lists "Elm Street" and "J. P. Williston," May 1864, Forbes; Petition to the Selectmen of Northampton, 12 May 1864, Reel 137, Town Papers, Forbes; NFP, 3 June 1864.

59. "Veteran," NFP, 1 March 1864; Northampton subscription list, "Dudley and Fisk," June 1864, Forbes.

60. Linderman, 218-9, 222; Reid Mitchell, "The Northern Soldier and His Community," in Vinovskis, ed., Toward A Social History, 86-90; Lyman to Wright, 24 July 1863, Historic Northampton.

61. HG, 29 November 1864; NFP, 12, 15, 19, 22 July, 4, 16, 26 August, 27 December 1864.

62. HG, 23, 30 January 1865.

63. HG, 17 April 1865; NFP, 14 March, 17, 20 April, 20 June 1865; Northampton subscription lists, various locations, February 1865, Forbes.